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Abstract— The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key 
exchange protocol had been introduced as an ultra-low cost 
alternative of quantum cryptography. Two years ago we have 
developed a generalized version of the KLJN key exchanger 
(VGM-KLJN), and we have proved that the system works 
perfectly secure under much more general conditions that allows 
compensation of many kinds of imperfections. In this work we 
focus on the experimental analysis of our recently introduced 
VGM-KLJN system. We determine the time required to transfer 
a bit, the error rate of the information transfer and we also 
evaluate the probability of successful eavesdropping in the case of 
different imperfections of the components. We demonstrate a 
method of real-time identification and compensation of these 
imperfections. The results of our analysis can greatly aid 
practical applications and at the same time can serve as a guide 
to design a system with the required security level. 
Keywords— KLJN; VGM-KLJN; secure key exchange; 
unconditional security; secure key distribution; noise 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key exchange 
protocol had been introduced in 2006 as an ultra-low cost 
classical physical alternative of quantum cryptography [1]. 
While it offers unconditional security as well, only a few 
electronic components – resistors with Johnson noise sources – 
are required to achieve very high levels of security, and it can 
even be integrated into circuits, microchips. In the KLJN 
system there are two selectable resistors with higher and lower 
values at both communication parties. The selected resistors at 
the ends of the communication line are connected to form a 
loop. Johnson noise of the resistors is used to exchange and 
hide the information from the eavesdropper at the same time. 
Measuring the noisy voltage and current in this loop informs 
the communicating parties about the selection state of the 
resistors at both ends, while the eavesdropper can’t determine 
which resistors are used by the communicating ones. In other 
words, a bit can be securely exchanged. 
A. The description of the KLJN protocol 
The KLJN system can be used to exchange a secret key for 
single use to encrypt data. In the original system, the 
communication between the two parties, usually called Alice 
and Bob, are realized by resistor pairs. During the transfer of a 
bit of the secret key Alice and Bob connects one of their 
resistors with publicly known lower or higher value, RL or RH, 
to the communication wire randomly. Due to the Johnson noise 
(thermal noise) of the resistors random voltage will be present 
on the communication wire and random current can be 
observed in the loop. The resulting loop resistance therefore 
can be determined by measuring these signals. Since Alice and 
Bob know the resistor value at their side, they can determine 
the resistor value at the other side by measuring the loop 
resistance. On the other hand, the eavesdropper Eve has less 
information. If the selected resistors at the two ends have the 
same value (RL or RH), then Eve knows the state as well. 
However, if the resistors are different at the two terminals, Eve 
will measure the same noise properties for both possible states, 
therefore she does not have information about which party used 
RL and which one connected RH to the wire. It is important to 
note that in this case there is no correlation between the voltage 
and current observed by Eve, in other words, the system is in 
thermal equilibrium, no power flows from one end to the other. 
These two states, LH and HL can be used to share a bit 
secretly. Note that since the thermal noise amplitude is very 
small, separate voltage generators are needed in practical 
applications. 
B. The generalized KLJN protocol 
Recently we have developed a generalized version of the 
KLJN key exchanger (so called VGM-KLJN system, see 
Fig. 1), and we have proved that the system works perfectly in 
much more general conditions [2,3]. We have shown that all 
four resistor values can be arbitrarily chosen independently of 
each other. It is not required to have the same RH and RL values 
at the two ends, the only restriction is to have two different 
values at a given end. In this system, non-zero correlation can 
be present between the current and voltage at any point of the 
wire, i.e. the system is not any more in thermal equilibrium, 
power can flow from one end to the other. However, by 
properly tuning the amplitudes of the voltage noise generators, 
it can be the same for both the LH and HL cases. Many 
limitations caused by non-ideal component values, finite wire 
resistance can be compensated by tuning the amplitude of the 
voltage noise generators. Our results inspired a new protocol as 
well (RRRT-KLJN [4]). 
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 Fig. 1. The block diagram of the generalized VGM-KLJN system. Alice and 
Bob have two independent pairs of lower and higher resistors of any value. 
The only restriction is to have two different values at a given end. VMA, IA, 
VMB and IB are the voltage and current values measured and shared by Alice 
and Bob. 
In this work, we focus on the experimental analysis of our 
VGM-KLJN system concerning the time required to transfer a 
bit, the error rate of the information transfer and the evaluation 
of the probability of successful eavesdropping. We show how 
efficient bit detection can be implemented by using the VGM-
KLJN system. We also perform analytical and numerical 
analysis on how the required bit exchange time depends on the 
selection of the resistor values. Certain imperfection of the 
components, like the tolerance of resistors, causes information 
leakage. Here we also provide a detailed analysis of these 
effects, and show a method of real-time identification and 
compensation of these imperfections as well. 
The results of our analysis can aid practical applications 
radically and can serve as a guide to design a system with the 
required security level in the same time as well. 
II. BIT DETECTION FOR ALICE AND BOB 
A sample voltage signal during a bit exchange process is 
shown in Fig. 2. In order to avoid the effects of the transients 
the signal is ramped up at the beginning and ramped down at 
the end of the bit exchange, then low pass filters are used to 
limit the bandwidth that is required to prevent information leak 
[5]. The stationary signal part followed by the ramping up is 
used by Alice and Bob to compute the statistics of the signals. 
As it was mentioned in section I.A for the original KLJN 
system, it can be easily determined using the voltage and 
current signals if the system is in the LL, HH or one of the 
secure LH or HL states [6]. 
 
Fig. 2. Demonstration of the voltage signal of the wire during the transfer of 
a single bit. Alice and Bob can evaluate the statistics properly in the time 
window defined by the two vertical dashed lines. 
Voltage signals can be used to distinguish between HH and 
other states, while current signals need to be analyzed in order 
to separate the LL state clearly from all other states, see Fig. 3 
[6]. Since the probability densities are practically the same for 
the generalized VGM-KLJN key exchanger, the method is 
applicable in this case as well. 
 
Fig. 3. Histograms of the measured standard deviation of voltage (left panel) 
and current (right panel). The HH or LL states can be separated efficiently by 
analyzing the voltage or current signals, respectively. 
A. Statistics of the measured signals 
The estimated standard deviations of the signals during the 
bit exchange have some uncertainty, therefore it has a certain 
likelihood for false detection of the real state. 
 
Fig. 4. Exaggerated figure of the voltage statistic, showing the meaning of 
Perr and Pdrop. 
As it is shown in Fig. 4, a threshold can be chosen to tune 
the probability Perr of falsely considering the HH state as a 
valid bit (LH or HL state), and to set the probability Pdrop of 
dropping a valid secure bit due to recognizing a valid secure 
state as HH state: 
 )( thrHHerr SDFP =  (1) 
 )( thrsecdrop SDFP =  (2) 
Here FHH is the probability distribution function of the HH 
state, Fsec is the probability distribution function of the secure 
states, SDthr is the selected threshold value. 
The aim of the communicating parties is to reduce Perr as 
much as possible in order to avoid false detections of insecure 
bits. However, decreasing Perr will elevate Pdrop, therefore some 
proportion of secure bits will be dropped which reduces the bit 
transfer rate. Improving the accuracy of the measurement 
during a single bit transfer requires more time, therefore the bit 
rate will be smaller again. Consequently, the goal is to find the 
optimal measurement time for a given Perr that provides the 
highest bit transfer rate. 
Looking at Fig. 4. one could conclude that the probability 
density functions correspond to normal distribution, however, 
they do not. When determining the threshold levels it is easier 
to consider the voltage and current variances, since these are 
calculated by summing the square of a normally distributed 
variable, therefore the measured values follow χ2 distribution. 
The expected value of the variances ( 2σ ) can be determined 
using the values of the resistors and the amplitudes of the 
voltage generators. The variance of the measured variances can 
be given as k42 σ⋅ , where k is the number of independent 
measurement points. Since the bandwidth (fbw) of the system 
must be limited in order to prevent information leak [1], k is 
not equal to the number of samples (N) but can be 









fNk ⋅=⋅≈ , (3) 
where fs is the sample rate and fNyquist is the corresponding 
Nyquist frequency. In our current analysis, we are only 
interested in the statistical analysis of the protocol and not in 
the transient behavior. For this reason, wherever possible we 
ignore the bandwidth limitations of the communication, this 
way all points in the measurement window can be statistically 
independent from each other. In the following, the length of the 
measurement window is expressed in the number of 
statistically independent measurement points (k). 
B. Optimizing the bit detection time 
In the VGM-KLJN system the amplitude of one of the four 
voltage generators can be arbitrarily chosen, the other three 
must be calculated and set accordingly in order to guarantee 
security [3]. Using these and the circuit shown in Fig. 1 it is 
possible to determine the distribution of the voltages and 
currents for a given bit detection time. If the desired bit error 
rate is known, then it is possible to find the threshold values 
and the rate of dropped secure bits. 
Fig. 5 illustrates how the rate of dropped bits depends on 
the bit detection time for a certain set of resistor values and the 
error rate of 10-6. Both the theoretical and simulated results are 
plotted. 
 
Fig. 5. Ratio of the dropped secure bits (Pdrop) and bit transfer rate as a 
function of window length for a transfer of 20000 bits. RL=RLA=RLB=1 kΩ, 
RH=RHA=RHB=10 kΩ, RC=200 Ω. To calculate the bit rate, we used a 
bandwidth of 5 kHz, with a constant overhead of 8 ms/bit. 
The bit transfer rate can be calculated using the bit 
detection time and the rate of dropped bits. The bit transfer 
time depends on several factors including the bandwidth [8] 
and the ramp-up and ramp-down times used to avoid transients 
and the associated information leak. To calculate the bit rate, 
we used a bandwidth of 5 kHz, with a constant overhead of 
8 ms (at the beginning and the end of measurements). The 
number of transferred bits are reduced further by the fact that 
only half of the states correspond to the secure LH or HL 
states. 
It is easy to see on Fig. 5, that there is an optimal bit 
detection time that maximizes the secure bit transfer rate. This 
depends on the ratio of the higher and lower resistances RH/RL. 
As shown in Fig. 6, larger ratio reduces the required bit 
detection time therefore increases the bit transfer rate. 
 
Fig. 6. Optimal window length and maxima of detected secure bits as a 
function of RH/RL ratio for a transfer of 50000 bits. 
The results above were obtained using resistor values 
compatible with the original KLJN system, however the wire 
resistance was compensated according to the VGM-KLJN 
theory. Fig. 7 reports on results for more general resistor 
configurations used in [2]. Note that the lower transfer rates are 
due to the lower RH/RL rates on both sides. 
 
Fig. 7. Bit rate for more generalized resistance setups for a transfer of 30000 
bits. In case of Set 1, RLA=1 kΩ, RHA=10 kΩ, RLB=5 kΩ, RHB=9 kΩ, 
RC=200 Ω, optimal window length is 260 points, in case of Set 2 RLA=1 kΩ, 
RHA=5 kΩ, RLB=5 kΩ, RHB=9 kΩ, RC=200 Ω, optimal window length is 460 
points. 
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE AND REAL-TIME COMPENSATION 
Full security of KLJN key exchange cannot be achieved in 
real systems [9]. The eavesdropper can measure the statistics of 
the current, voltage and their correlation at any point of the 
interconnecting wire, however her bit error rate (BER) will be 
higher than for Alice and Bob, can be very close to the 
perfectly secure 50%. 
We have carried out numerical simulations to evaluate BER for 
values of resistors or voltage generators that deviate from the 
ones required for security [3]. Fig. 8 shows the BER calculated 
from three different quantities as a function of the error of 
Bob’s higher value resistor. The system exhibits rather high 
sensitivity to the error of resistance, although resistors can be 
quite accurate and can be measured and compensated as well. 
Longer time available to the eavesdropper certainly increases 
the information leakage as depicted on Fig. 9. Note that the 
BER values and the effect of the components’ tolerance also 
depends on the resistor configuration of the generalized KLJN. 
 
Fig. 8. Eavesdropper’s bit error rate as a function of relative error of real RHB 
and nominal RHB value in case of Set 1 from Fig. 7. Time window has a length 
of 260 points. 
 
Fig. 9. Eavesdropper’s bit error rate as a function of the window length in 
case of Set 1 from Fig. 7, when RHB has a relative error of -5%. 
In order to generate information leak one of the simplest 
possibilities for the eavesdropper is the significant modification 
of the wire resistance RC. Fig. 10 shows that large changes in 
RC result in moderate drop of the BER and Alice and Bob can 
quickly detect this intrusion as illustrated by Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 10. Eavesdropper’s bit error rate as a function of cable resistor relative 
error in case of Set 1 measuring 260 points. 
Note that Alice and Bob can detect the change of RC 
instantly by comparing IA, IB, VMA és VMB, see Fig. 1. They can 
retune their noise generators accordingly to prevent 
information leak. 
 
Fig. 11. Statistics measured by Alice in case of Set 1 if the eavesdropper 
tampered the cable resistance. RC has a relative error of 1000% resulting in a 
voltage BER of 0.156. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The most important advantage of the VGM KLJN system is the 
ability to compensate non-ideal values of its components. 
Measuring the inaccuracies allows the parties to tune the 
amplitude of their noise generators to ensure secure 
communication. In this paper, we have shown how to 
determine the bit detection time required to maximize the bit 
transfer rate and to reduce the time available to the 
eavesdropper at the same time. We have also investigated the 
bit error rate and associated information leak in certain cases of 
deviations from ideal component values. Our results show that 
the communicating parties Alice and Bob can detect such 
problems and can compensate them even in real time.  
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